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Abstract:
Since the mid-1990’s, United States’ policy regarding child 
soldiers has evolved significantly. The US was initially a strong 
opponent of efforts to negotiate an international treaty 
prohibiting the participation of children under age 18 in armed 
conflict. In subsequent years, it not only ratified the treaty, but 
adopted groundbreaking legislation that allows the US to 
prosecute child recruiters on US soil, even if the recruitment 
took place outside the United States, and that restricts US 
military assistance to foreign governments that recruit or use 
child soldiers. Although the Obama administration has invoked 
national security interests to waive these military sanctions in 
many cases, the US has stepped up its diplomatic engagement on 
child soldiers, influencing signed agreements by Chad, South 
Sudan, and the Democratic Republic of Congo to end child 
recruitment and demobilize children from their forces. 
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INTRODUCTION
Until the year 2000, it was still legal under international law 
to recruit children as young as fifteen into military forces and 
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send them to the front lines of combat.2 This standard was an 
anomaly in international human rights law, as the Convention on 
the Rights of the Child (CRC) established a wide range of 
protections for children under the age of 18, including protection 
from sexual exploitation, child labor, and violence. When the 
CRC was negotiated, however, governments were unable to 
agree on 18 as the minimum age for recruitment and 
participation in armed conflict. Because of this, governments 
settled on the standard of age 15, previously set by the 1977 
Additional Protocols to the 1949 Geneva Conventions.3
Graça Machel’s groundbreaking 1996 UN Study on the 
Impact of Armed Conflict on Children brought new attention to 
the use of child soldiers.4 Studies by the Coalition to Stop the 
Use of Child Soldiers and its member organizations estimated 
that approximately 300,000 children under the age of 18 were 
participating in armed conflicts in as many as 30 countries.
Prompted by growing international concern and a 
recommendation from Machel, governments began negotiating 
an optional protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child 
on the involvement of children in armed conflict, intended to 
increase the minimum age for recruitment and participation in 
armed conflict to 18. Soon, however, these efforts met an 
unexpected obstacle: the United States. 
2. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, 
and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts 
(Protocol 1), art. 77, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3, and Protocol Additional to the Geneva 
Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of 
Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), art. 4, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609.
3. Convention on the Rights of the Child art. 38, Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 
U.N.T.S. 3 is based on the Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 
12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International 
Armed Conflicts (Protocol 1), art. 77, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3, and Protocol 
Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the 
Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), art. 
4, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609 (“[C]hildren who have not attained the age of fifteen 
years shall neither be recruited in the armed forces or groups nor allowed to 
take part in hostilities.”).
4. Promotion and Protection of the Rights of Children: Impact of 
Armed Conflict on Children, U.N. Doc. A/51/306, 26 August 1996.
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United States laws dating back to 1917 allow 17-year-olds to 
volunteer for the US armed forces with parental permission.5 As 
soon as these young recruits completed their basic and technical 
training, the armed forces assigned them to operational units, 
including combat units. In the early 1990s, 17-year-old soldiers 
fought for the United States in Bosnia, Somalia, and the 1991 
Gulf War.6 The Pentagon argued that recruiting 17-year olds was 
essential to maintain troop strength, but separating 17-year olds 
from their units would damage troop cohesion. In the United 
States, many students graduating from high school – the time 
when young people are most likely to consider military 
enlistment– are still seventeen. Waiting until those students
reached the age of 18, the US argued, would reduce enlistment 
rates, as these youth secured other employment or decided to 
continue their education. 
The United States saw no reason to change its practices, even 
to promote an international standard designed to reduce the 
number of child soldiers fighting in armed conflicts. It had an 
ally in the United Kingdom, which allowed sixteen-year-olds to 
join the armed forces and serve in combat roles, and compared to 
the US, had a much larger proportion of soldiers who were under 
18. During negotiations on the Optional Protocol in Geneva, 
both countries opposed setting 18 as either the minimum age for 
participation in hostilities or for voluntary recruitment. The US 
argued that the most significant problem was the recruitment of 
children under 15 in violation of existing international law, and 
that setting an age of 17 for recruitment and participation in 
hostilities had “a greater potential to secure consensus among the 
members of the General Assembly.”7 It sent demarches to other 
capitals, stating that it could not accept 18 as the minimum age 
5. 10 U.S.C. § 505(a) (2008).
6. United States Demarche on the Involvement of Children in Armed 
Conflict, March 1998, author’s files. 
7. Id.
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for either voluntary recruitment or participation in armed 
conflict.8
The vast majority of states participating in the Optional 
Protocol negotiations supported 18 as the minimum age for 
participation in hostilities, and many supported 18 as the 
minimum age for voluntary recruitment as well. They argued 
that military expediency did not justify adopting lesser 
protections for children facing the dangers of warfare than for 
children at risk of other forms of exploitation. However, the 
opposition from the United States and its allies created an 
impasse. During the 1998 negotiations, governments were 
unable to reach any agreement on the Optional Protocol and 
ended their session three days early. 
Alarmed at the lack of progress, a group of non-governmental 
organizations came together in 1998 to form the Coalition to 
Stop the Use of Child Soldiers (Coalition).9 The Coalition, 
including both human rights and humanitarian organizations, 
launched a global campaign, intended to build public pressure 
and political will on behalf of a “straight-18” international 
standard, i.e. 18 as the minimum age for conscription, voluntary 
recruitment, and any participation in armed conflict. Supported 
by a small secretariat in Geneva, the Coalition undertook a 
multi-faceted campaign to influence the course of the 
negotiations on the optional protocol. It published new research, 
organized a series of high-profile regional conferences, secured 
8. Although the US was the most vocal opponent, a handful of other 
states initially supported its position. Of the 50 states that participated in the 
1998 optional protocol negotiations, seven—Bangladesh, Cuba, Israel, Korea, 
Kuwait, Pakistan, and the UK – joined the US in supporting a minimum age of 
17 for participation in armed conflict. Four of these states, however, stated that 
they would not block an agreement setting the age at 18.
9. Initial members included Amnesty International, Human Rights 
Watch, International Federation Terre des Hommes, Jesuit Refugee Service, the 
Quaker United Nations Office (Geneva), and Save the Children.
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media coverage of the issue, and supported advocacy by national 
coalitions with their individual governments.10
In the United States, sixty organizations joined the US 
Campaign to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers. The campaign met 
with the State Department and Pentagon officials to discuss the 
US position towards the Optional Protocol, and engaged 
members of Congress to introduce resolutions, make floor 
speeches, and write letters to then President Clinton, urging the 
US not to block the negotiations on the Optional Protocol.11 The 
campaign publicized Department of Defense data that showed 
that less than one quarter of one percent of enlisted troops who 
had completed training and been assigned to units were still 
under the age of 18.12 To address Pentagon concerns about 
military readiness, the campaign organized a letter to President 
Clinton from thirty-seven retired US military officers, urging the 
US to end its opposition to the Optional Protocol and stating that 
excluding 17-year olds from military operations would not hurt 
US national security.13 Simultaneously, US officials within the 
State and Defense Departments urged a review of the US 
position, concerned about growing attention to the US as an 
outlier on the child soldiers issue.14
10. See Jo BECKER, Campaigning to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers, in,
CAMPAIGNING FOR JUSTICE: HUMAN RIGHTS ADVOCACY IN PRACTICE 11, 11-31
(Stanford University Press, 2013).
11. In January 1998, for example, sixty-three members of Congress 
wrote to President Clinton, expressing grave concern that the US was blocking
progress on the optional protocol and urging the US to either change its 
position or not stand in the way of negotiations. Congressional resolutions 
similarly urged the US not to block the negotiations. See, e.g., H.R. Con. Res. 
209, 111th Cong. (1999).
12. Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense, Population 
Representation in the Military Service (1999) (publishing Table A-1. FY 1999 
Applicants* for Active Component Enlistment by Age, Service, and Gender 
with Civilian Comparison Group).
13. Letter to President William J. Clinton, December 1997, author’s
files. 
14. Elizabeth Olson, U.S. Flights Tide on a Move to Raise the Military 
Service Age, NEW YORK TIMES, Jan. 15, 2000 (noting that the U.S. found itself 
with “few allies” on the issue).
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In January 2000, government reconvened for a final round of 
negotiations on the Optional Protocol. During the second week 
of negotiations, the US changed its position and agreed to join a 
consensus on setting 18 as the minimum age for direct 
participation in hostilities. This paved the way for consensus on 
the final text of the protocol, establishing 18 as the minimum age 
for direct participation in hostilities, for any forced recruitment 
or conscription into government forces, and for any recruitment 
into non-governmental armed groups.15 The text set a lower age 
for voluntary recruitment into governmental armed forces, 
however, requiring states simply to “raise the minimum age for 
the voluntary recruitment of persons into their national armed 
forces from that set out in article 38, paragraph 3, of the 
Convention on the Rights of the Child” (which stipulated 15). It 
also required states to implement safeguards to ensure proof of 
age, parental permission, and that recruitment was genuinely 
voluntary. Although the provision on voluntary recruitment was 
a disappointment to NGOs, the agreement on 18 for participation 
in hostilities was considered a huge victory. 
Later, it became known that Secretary of State Madeleine 
Albright had urged the joint chiefs of staff for a top-level review 
of whether the armed forces could accept an 18-year old limit for 
combat.16 Their agreement allowed the US to change its position 
and support the Protocol. With the Defense Department on 
board, the US asked for a final provision in the protocol, 
allowing states that had signed but not ratified the Convention on 
the Rights of the Child to become parties. Typically, only 
ratifying parties to a “parent” convention ratify an optional 
protocol, but as a non-state party to the CRC, the US sought ––
and secured –– an exception. 
15. Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on 
the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict, adopted May 25, 2000, G.A. 
Resolution 54/263, Annex I, 54 U.N. GAOR Supp. (no.49) at 7, U.N. Doc. 
A/54/49, vol. III (2000).
16. Author conversation with US government representative, January 
2000. 
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The shift in the US’ position on the Optional Protocol opened 
the way for much stronger US policies supporting an end to the 
use of child soldiers. After the Protocol’s adoption, President 
Clinton hailed the new treaty as “a historic achievement to 
protect the world’s children,”17 and signed the Optional Protocol 
at a ceremony at the United Nations just a few months later. The 
United States ratified the optional protocol on December 23, 
2002, together with the Optional Protocol to the CRC on the sale 
of children, child prostitution, and child pornography.18 As of 
early-2014, these remained the last human rights treaties ratified 
by the United States. Following the ratification of the protocol, 
each branch of the armed services issued new policies excluding 
17-year old members of the armed forces from combat duties.19
This was the first time that the US had changed its military 
practices in order to support a new international standard; in the 
past, the US had only signed onto treaties that were already 
consistent with its own policies, or entered reservations stating 
that it would continue practices otherwise prohibited by the 
treaty. 
In 2002 Congress adopted the Foreign Relations 
Authorization Act of FY 03 (H.R.1646), which required the State 
Department’s annual human rights reports to include the “nature 
and extent of the compulsory recruitment and conscription of 
individuals under the age of 18” by all armed groups in every 
country.20 The law required the State Department to describe the 
steps taken by governments to eliminate such practices and to 
indicate the countries that have ratified the Optional Protocol. 
17. Press Release, President Bill Clinton, Office of the Press Secretary
(Jan. 21, 2000).
18. Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on 
the Sale of Children, ͒Child Prostitution and Child Pornography, General 
Assembly resolution A/RES/54/263 of 25 May 2000.
19. U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, INITIAL REPORT OF THE UNITED STATES OF 
AMERICA TO THE UN COMMITTEE ON THE RIGHTS OF THE CHILD CONCERNING 
THE OPTIONAL PROTOCOL TO THE CONVENTION ON THE RIGHTS OF THE CHILD ON 
THE INVOLVEMENT OF CHILDREN IN ARMED CONFLICT, 14 September 2002, 
available at www.state.gov.
20. Foreign Relations Authorization Act of FY 03 (H.R.1646) (2002). 
602 Michigan State International Law Review [Vol. 22.2
The 2003 report, released in February of 2004, highlighted 28 
countries with active child soldiers.
Based on the US’ new adherence to the Optional Protocol, 
advocates began lobbying members of Congress for a new law 
that would prohibit military assistance to governments that used 
child soldiers in their armed forces or supported militias or 
paramilitary groups that did so, in violation of the standards set 
by the optional protocol.21 Research by the Center for Defense 
Information found that of nine governments involved in child 
recruitment and use, eight received some form of US military 
assistance in 2007.22 The advocates argued that US tax dollars 
should not be used to support the use of child soldiers abroad, 
and that the US should insist on the same standards for its 
military allies as it used for its own troops. 
They found support from Senator Richard Durbin, a 
Democrat from Illinois, and Senator Sam Brownback, a 
Republican from Kansas. In April 2007, the senators introduced 
the Child Soldier Prevention Act into Congress.23 With support 
from both Democrats and Republicans, the bill was adopted into 
law in 2008 as part of the Trafficking Victims Protection 
Reauthorization Act.24 The law was groundbreaking. At the time, 
only one other government had any similar legislation: the
Belgian Parliament had adopted a law in 2003 barring arms 
transfers to forces using child soldiers.
Specifically, the Child Soldier Prevention Act restricts the 
provision of US International Military Education and Training, 
foreign military financing, and other defense-related assistance 
to countries identified in the State Department’s annual 
Trafficking in Persons report as recruiting or using child soldiers 
21. The initiative was supported by the U.S. Campaign to Stop the Use 
of Child Soldiers, and led by World Vision USA, Human Rights Watch, 
Amnesty International USA, and Rachel Stohl from the Center for Defense
Information.
22. CENTER FOR DEFENSE INFORMATION, U.S. MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO 
COUNTRIES USING CHILD SOLDIERS, 1990-2007 (2007).
23. Child Soldier Prevention Act, S. 1175, introduced April 19, 2007. 
24. Title IV, William Wilberforce Trafficking Victims Protection 
Reauthorization Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-457.
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in government armed forces or government-supported 
paramilitaries or militias in violation of international standards. 
The law included a provision allowing the president to waive the 
sanctions provisions of the law in cases of national interest.25
In 2007, Senator Durbin also introduced the Child Soldier 
Accountability Act.26 Enacted into law in 2008, the Act makes it 
a federal crime to knowingly recruit or to use soldiers under the 
age of 15 and permits the United States to prosecute any 
individual on US soil for the offense, even if the children were 
recruited or served as soldiers outside the United States. The law 
imposes penalties of up to 20 years, or up to life in prison if their 
action resulted in the child’s death. It also allows the United 
States to deport or deny entry to individuals who have knowingly 
recruited children as soldiers. The law was used for the first time 
in 2012, when a New York State immigration judge ordered the 
deportation of George Boley, a former commander of the 
Liberian Peace Council, a non-state armed group involved in 
Liberia’s civil war.27
Implementation of the Child Soldier Prevention Act has been 
problematic. The law went into effect in 2010, following the 
State Department’s finding that six countries -- Burma, Chad, 
Democratic Republic of Congo, Somalia, Sudan, and Yemen –
were using child soldiers in violation of international standards.28
Of the six, only Burma received no US military assistance, while 
Somalia received peacekeeping assistance that was outside the 
scope of the Child Soldier Prevention Act. For the remaining 
four countries, however, President Obama invoked his authority 
25. Id. See § 404 (c).
26. Child Soldier Accountability Act, S. 2135, introduced October 3, 
2007, enacted into Pub. L. No. 110-340 (Oct. 3, 2008).
27. Liberian Ordered Deported Over Child Soldier Allegations, VOICE 
OF AMERICA (Feb. 7, 2012, 10:35 AM), http://blogs.voanews.com/breaking-
news/2012/02/07/liberian-ordered-deported-over-child-soldier-al legations/.
28. U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS REPORT 2010, June 
2010, at 10. 
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to issue national security waivers, allowing each to continue 
receiving US military assistance.29
NGOs strongly condemned the administration’s waivers, 
accusing the administration of undercutting the intent of the 
law.30 A White House spokesperson defended the decision, 
saying “We put these four countries on notice by naming them as 
having child soldiers . . . .Our intention is to work with them 
over the next year to try to solve this problem – or at least make 
significant progress on it – and reassess our posture towards 
them next year, depending on the progress they have made.”31 In 
response to public criticism, White House officials held a 
conference call with interested NGOs to discuss the waivers, and 
began a pattern of twice-yearly consultations to discuss 
implementation of the Child Soldier Prevention Act. 
In 2011, the State Department found that the same six 
countries were using child soldiers. The administration again 
issued waivers for Chad and Yemen,32 but withheld 
approximately US $1.3 million in foreign military financing 
from Congo conditioned on certain benchmarks, including 
signing a UN action plan to end its use of child soldiers, 
providing UN inspection teams access to military installations, 
and removing and prosecuting commanders that recruit children.
A partial waiver allowed continued US military training to 
Congolese forces.33
29. Presidential Memorandum – Child Soldiers Prevention Act, (Oct.
25, 2010), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2010/10/25/presidential
-memorandum-child-soldiers-prevention-act.
30. Brian Knowlton, 4 Nations with Child Soldiers Keep U.S. Aid, NEW 
YORK TIMES, Oct. 28, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/29/world/africa/
29soldiers.html.
31. Brian Knowlton, 4 Nations with Child Soldiers Keep U.S. Aid, NEW 
YORK TIMES, Oct. 28, 2010 (quoting Tommy Vietor).
32. U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS REPORT 2011, June 
2011. The administration said that the law did not apply to South Sudan, since 
it became independent after the State Department issued its list in June 2011.
33. Presidential Memorandum – Child Soldiers Prevention Act (Oct. 4, 
2011), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/10/04/presidential-
memorandum-child-soldiers-prevention-act-2008.
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Although NGOs continued to criticize the waivers, the 
administration began taking other steps to encourage countries 
receiving US military assistance to comply with international 
standards. In particular, it increased diplomatic pressure on 
Chad, South Sudan, and the DRC to sign action plans with the 
United Nations to end their use of child soldiers. Chad signed 
such a plan in June 2011, and South Sudan signed a plan in 
March 2012. In both cases, UN officials said that US pressure 
contributed to the agreements.34 In November 2012, US State 
Department officials traveled to Chad and South Sudan 
specifically to press the governments to effectively implement 
the action plans.
In 2012, the administration again issued waivers to Yemen 
and South Sudan,35 while removing Chad from its list, despite 
reports that children remained in Chad’s forces (Chad was 
returned to the list in 2013).36 It increased the pressure on the 
Congo, announcing in September that not only was the US 
continuing to withhold foreign military financing from Congo 
because of its use of child soldiers, but in addition, that it would 
not train a Congolese light infantry battalion until Congo signed 
an action plan with the UN to end its use of child soldiers.37 At 
the time, the UN had tried but failed for seven years to get the 
Congolese government to agree to a plan. In a public statement, 
Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Johnnie Carson 
said, “[b]y withholding this desired assistance until an Action 
Plan is signed, we wish to re-emphasize to the Government of 
the DRC that the Government of the United States takes this 
34. Telephone and email communications between UN officials and 
author, 2012. 
35. Presidential Memorandum -- Presidential Determination with 
respect to the Child Soldiers Prevention Act of 2008 (Sept. 28, 2012),
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2012/09/28/presidential-
memorandum-presidential-determination-respect-child-soldier.
36. U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS REPORT 2013, June 
2013.
37. Press Release, Assistant Secretary Johnnie Carson (Sept. 28, 2012), 
http://www.humanrights.gov /2012/09/28/statement-by-assistant-secretary-
carson-on-child-soldiers-in-the-democratic-republic-of-congo/.
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issue seriously.”38 Just days after the US announcement, the 
DRC finally signed the plan, agreeing to end all child 
recruitment, demobilize all children in its forces, and allow UN 
verification visits to its barracks. 
Despite this impact, the United States could do much more. 
For example, South Sudan was slated to receive over $60 million 
in US military assistance in 2012, though only a small fraction 
could be withheld under the law. The administration could have 
simultaneously addressed its national interests and done more to 
protect children with the same approach it used in Congo – by
withholding portions of aid and training. Instead, in 2012,
Obama gave South Sudan a full waiver under the Child Soldiers 
Prevention Act, citing national interests.39 The action left the US 
with little leverage to demand South Sudan’s compliance with its 
UN action plan.
Similarly, Yemen is the country using child soldiers that 
receives, by far, the largest amount of US assistance. The 
administration requested over $100 million for Yemen for 2013, 
including over $20 million eligible for sanctions under the Child 
Soldiers Prevention Act. Children were used by all sides during 
the uprising that forced out Yemen’s abusive president in 2012, 
including in the government’s elite Republican guard.40 But for 
three years in a row, the US failed to sanction even a small 
amount of US assistance.
At the time of this writing, the State Department had recently 
increased the number of governments identified as using child 
soldiers in violation of international standards, listing ten 
countries: Burma, Central African Republic, Chad, Democratic 
Republic of Congo, Rwanda, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, 
38. Id.
39. Presidential Memorandum -- Presidential Determination with 
respect to the Child Soldiers Prevention Act of 2008 (Sept. 28, 2012),
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2012/09/28/presidential-
memorandum-presidential-determination-respect-child-soldier.
40. , Yemen: Stop Using Children in Armed Forces, HUMAN RIGHTS 
WATCH (April 14, 2011), http://www.hrw.org/news/2011/04/14/yemen-stop-
using-children-armed-forces.
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Syria, and Yemen.41 Of the ten, only Burma, Sudan, and Syria 
did not receive some form of military assistance sanctioned 
under the Child Soldier Prevention Act. Although the US has 
legitimate national security interests in many of these countries, 
the US’ approach of withholding partial assistance from the 
DRC offers an effective way forward, by balancing perceived 
national security interests with its stated priority to end the use of 
child soldiers.42
CONCLUSION
In twelve years, the United States has made a transition from 
being one of the biggest obstacles to international efforts to end 
the use of child soldiers, to being an international leader on the 
issue. The US not only changed its military practices for the first 
time to support new international standards, it also adopted 
groundbreaking legislation – the Child Soldier Prevention Act 
and the Child Soldier Accountability Act – that have almost no 
precedent. While critics still believe that the United States should 
be more aggressive in withholding military assistance from 
governments using child soldiers under the Child Soldier 
Prevention Act, the US has stepped up its diplomatic 
engagement on the issue, and in at least three cases, has been 
instrumental in securing foreign governments’ agreement to 
enter into a UN action plan to end their use of child soldiers. In 
the case of the DRC, issuing a partial waiver under the Child 
Soldiers Prevention Act while withholding other assistance 
prompted the Congo to sign a long-delayed UN action plan to 
end its use of child soldiers and provided a pragmatic model that 
allows the US to maintain its military interests and also use its 
41. U.S. State Dep’t, Trafficking in Persons Report, U.S. DEPARTMENT 
OF STATE DIPLOMACY IN ACTION (2013), http://www.state.gov/j/tip/rls/tiprpt
/2013/210544.htm.
42. Jo Becker, Dispatches: US Pushes Some Countries to End Child 
Soldier Use, but Lets Others Off, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (Oct. 1, 2013),
http://www.hrw.org/news/2013/09/30/dispatches-us-pushes-some-countries-
end-child-soldier-use-lets-others.
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leverage to secure concrete action to end the recruitment and use 
of child soldiers.
